“I also realised that it is equally possible to be a liberal theist or a bigoted atheist, and I realised that I much prefer the former.””

Yes, this paragraph impressed me very much!

Thank you! You’re “Dogster?”

Debbie

You’re ‘Vicky’ from h2g2 right?

Debbie

It’s actually a good point. I don’t pretend to have an answer to the paradoxes of democracy, and I don’t pretend to know how we should conduct ourselves in the absence of moral absolutes. I suggest, though, that my contribution to our collective guesswork is better that any pretence of a known solution.

And yeah I don’t get the condom thing either. I guess they’re against wanking and wet dreams too. Actually, I wonder if the latter is sinful – worth pondering.

In Catholic superstition, life behins at the moment of conception. It thus follows that abortion, stem-cell research, certain forms of contraception (eg IUDs – but not, surely condoms?) are immoral. An atheist argument (or, at least, a non-Catholic one) against this is that small clumps of cells do not have a consciousness – but see the arguments above concerning neurones and thermostats.

However…isn’t there a hint of vestigial superstition in affording special consideration on the basis of consciousness? Consider that consciousness does not appear to have a special place in the universe. There is no grand scheme in which stars may explode, but conscious entities are not be wiped out by tsunamis. Indeed, the very idea of consciousness may be ‘Explained Away’ as simply the combined effect of neurological pathways that give certain organisms the control mechanisms that maximise the probability of certain biochemical processes occuring. So let’s remember our place.

On the other hand…we do tacitly acknowledge an ethical hierarchy which seems to correlate with consiousness. At the higher end, we (mostly) agree that (avoidably) killing people is (usually) wrong. (and, by the way, this might include humans who are as yet ‘merely’ collections of cells incapable of unsupported cells: any potential parent would regard the involuntary abortion of a wanted foetus as an outrage). At the lower end, we’re happy to disassemble thermostats without qualm. Somewhere in between there’s a continuum, and there are individual disagreements about whether it’s reasonable to kill fish, chickens, cows, dogs, bonobos. There are endless arguments along the lines of ‘Can lobsters feel pain’…and I recently discovered that the rules for halal slaughter include that animals must be transported kindly, fed beforehand and not killed in the presence of other animals (presumably so as not to worry them).

But is this really an argument about Consciousness? I suggest that really it’s about our own empathy. We regard as ethical that which we feel broadly comfortable with. We don’t think we’ll feel comfortable in a society in which human slaughter is tolerated (especially if we’re the ones up for slaughter). We don’t much care about lobsters, fish or thermostats…but as one gets higher up the mammalian hierarchy, animals get cuter and cuter.

So let’s be honest Atheist Fundamentalists here. A ’scientific’ basis for morality is just as superstitious as a religious one – it’s making a god of new discoveries in the philosophy of neuroscience. All we actually know about morality is what we will or will not collectively tolerate. Which – alarmingly – seems to be ‘quite a lot’.

This is an interesting question so just to make sure we’re talking about the same thing, let me rephrase this in my own way and see if you agree. As an example, we might say that an ethical principle might say “If X is the case, then do Y”. The principle itself isn’t grounded in facts about the world, but since X is a fact about the world, the decision to do Y is grounded in fact. If this is what you’re saying, then as long as religion limited itself to ethical principles “If X then Y” and didn’t make claims about X then this would be OK?

“Beliefs about the afterlife are I think highly relevant to many murder cases.”

Tell me more…

“On the other hand I have always found that in practise racists are irrational, in particular they form beliefs about the targets of their racism that are not based on evidence.”

But which comes first, the racism or the beliefs about the targets of their racism? My feeling is that the racism comes first, not the beliefs. I doubt there’s a generally applicable formula here though, it probably happens both ways round.

“I have no idea what proportion of violence comes from religion. I’m prepared to believe that it’s only a small fraction. But I don’t think it matters.”

OK that’s fine. Some people make rather grandiose claims about what the elimination of religion would achieve, you’re obviously not doing so.

Re the Catholic church’s role in the problem of AIDS in Africa and religion’s treatment of women generally, I concede this point (I think I already did?). I’m not decided about to what extent this sort of thing is integral to religious belief, but if indeed they are not separable beliefs then I would agree that there is a moral imperative to oppose religious belief. Are they separable though? My instinct tells me that religious belief, like all belief, is remarkably plastic (although changes can take a long time to achieve). If this is the case, then our best policy regarding the problems mentioned at the beginning of this paragraph is probably the one you described in your first post on this entry:

“The intolerance I propose is only that you would have for someone who made racist remarks in your presence.”

So, as part of an answer to your last point, I don’t think we should show any deference towards religious belief and certainly not towards religious institutions.

“It could well be true that the stated reason was in every case an occupation – but it doesn’t follow that the real reasons are purely political and not at all religious.”

Hmm, I didn’t really summarise that study very well. The amazon.com review of Pape’s book is actually quite a good summary. The point is not that the stated reason is an occupation, but – quoting the amazon review – that almost all (95% of) suicide bombings “occur as part of coherent campaigns” which have a “clear goal that is secular and political: to compel a modern democracy to withdraw military forces from the territory that the terrorists view as their homeland”.

The argument then is that suicide bombings don’t occur when there is no occupation, and they can occur without religion (the Tamil Tigers). Now I agree that this doesn’t show the problem to be “purely political”, but it certainly suggests quite strongly that it is much more about politics than about religion.

“Anyhow, I’m interested to know what you think of Dawkins’ point number 5″

I didn’t reply about this before because I don’t think he makes a very good case here. In that article he explicitly allies himself with Sam Harris so I’ll illustrate my point with reference to a Sam Harris article rather than a Dawkins one. In an article in the LA times Harris said:

“Unless liberals realize that there are tens of millions of people in the Muslim world who are far scarier than Dick Cheney, they will be unable to protect civilization from its genuine enemies.”

In the same article he excuses “collateral damage” as being morally distinct from intentional murder, even if the numbers involved are hugely worse in the former than the latter. He claims that Israel unquestionably has the moral high ground compared to the Palestinians. He also says:

“This benighted religious solidarity may be the greatest problem facing civilization…”

I would say that this is precisely the sort of view I want to dissociate myself from. If Dawkins doesn’t indulge in such appalling rhetoric and politically backwards analysis, he ought to dissociate himself from Harris.

Incidentally I came across this article when coincidentally reading a critique of it earlier today. Unfortunately you have to pay to download the original.

“Suppose now that religion was circumscribed to providing ethical frameworks for situations in which R1 doesn’t apply ”

I wasn’t even advocating limiting religious activity to this extent! But even so, I’m not convinced there are any such situations – every ethical decision is to some extent grounded in facts about the world – and it therefore matters how beliefs about those facts were arrived at. Beliefs about the afterlife are I think highly relevant to many murder cases.

“In what way does R1 tell you not to be a racist? It doesn’t. It might tell you facts about race which undermine ad-hoc arguments for being racist, but it can’t on its own stop you from being a racist.”

I agree with you here – I don’t think rationality is really connected to moral propositions. I don’t think racists are necessarily irrational – just objectionable. On the other hand I have always found that in practise racists are irrational, in particular they form beliefs about the targets of their racism that are not based on evidence. But I admit that a racist can be R1. My problem with racism is not the failure of rationality – it’s just that I think in a great many cases a good dose of R1 thinking could undermine racism significantly. Take the essay of Orwell that you linked to about anti-Sematism in England for example – he details how people formed beliefs about Jews in ways unrelated to the balance of evidence.

“Now I suspect that if you look at history you would be able to explain much – perhaps most – violence in terms which were religion-neutral.”

I have no idea what proportion of violence comes from religion. I’m prepared to believe that it’s only a small fraction. But I don’t think it matters. Drink-driving deaths may be a small fraction of the total amount of crime, but that doesn’t mean you shouldn’t campaign against drink-driving.

“I’d say it was clear in this case that although religion is used tactically, if there were no occupations there would be no suicide bombings. The problem is political, not religious.”

I deliberately avoided the example of suicide bombings – for reasons somewhat connected with your comments. But the examples I mentioned before are surely sufficient by themselves: 1. the role of the Catholic church in dealing with AIDS in Africs, and 2. the status of women in large parts of the Islamic world. It may be that all parties involved could be rational and still do these things – but as a matter of fact I think they are not rational – and I think that fact has a lot to do with why these people are doing these things – even though logically there could be some other reason.

On reflection, I’m not really convinced by the study you quote on suicide bombings. It could well be true that the stated reason was in every case an occupation – but it doesn’t follow that the real reasons are purely political and not at all religious. If you look at men who murder their wives, you’ll probably find that often the stated reason is their wife’s infidelity. But it doesn’t follow that infidelity was ‘the’ problem. I’d say there were other factors that probably led that guy to kill his wife. It coule well be true that ‘no infidelity’ would mean ‘no wife-murders’, but that’s just not the point. You would want to ask other questions about what facilitated the murders – why did he have 10 guns in the drawer upstairs? Did he have a history of violence? for example. Similarly with suicide bombers, I think one is naturally led to ask questions beyond their stated reasons for their actions – and I think the answers lie in implausible beliefs about the existence of an afterlife. Certainly many suicide bombers homes are found to contain literature about martyrdom (in the religious sense), and what awaits them and their families after death – so it’s clear that the people involved are thinking about these things. The fact that most suicide bombings are carried out by Tamil Tigers is also an irrelevance – there may be men who murder their wives who do not have 10 guns in their house – and in that case your investigations would be led elsewhere. I was slightly reluctant to write this paragraph, because I think the case is much weaker than with AIDS and treatment of women, and there is certainly a big political component to the problem – but I don’t think one can reasonably claim that the evidence shows the problem to be purely political.

Anyhow, I’m interested to know what you think of Dawkins’ point number 5 – about being confrontational towards religion. And also about the deference people show (undeservedly I think) towards faith positions.

Simon

Suppose now that religion was circumscribed to providing ethical frameworks for situations in which R1 doesn’t apply – that’s sort of the direction it was headed in the UK until recently. In this scenario, there is no conflict between R1 and F because they are applied mutually exclusively. Now I still think that even in this scenario there is an argument against religion based on power relationships and social dynamics, but I don’t think that rationality / irrationality is significant here, what is significant is politics.

Now I actually think that there is an irreducible faith component to all morality, but that doesn’t have to be tied to religion of course. I also think there’s an irreducible faith component to knowledge as well, but for the purposes of this argument let’s leave that aside.

Since you don’t want to talk about Stalin and Hitler, let’s talk generically about racism instead. In what way does R1 tell you not to be a racist? It doesn’t. It might tell you facts about race which undermine ad-hoc arguments for being racist, but it can’t on its own stop you from being a racist. If a white person just hates people with black skin, rationality has nothing to say about that. So an R1 rational society could just as well be involved in horrific acts of racial violence as a faith based society. Now I suspect that if you look at history you would be able to explain much – perhaps most – violence in terms which were religion-neutral. A Marxist would attempt to explain all of history in terms of materialism, basically economic struggle. Now I suspect that’s not quite right, but I think there is a very significant kernel of truth to this way of looking at the world.

To take a contemporary example. At the moment, suicide bombing is usually considered to be a byproduct of faith (things like the 72 virgins claim). But a comprehensive study of suicide bombings showed that in every known case of suicide bombing, an occupation of one country by another was the claimed reason for doing it (and that the majority of suicide bombings were not by Muslims). I’d say it was clear in this case that although religion is used tactically, if there were no occupations there would be no suicide bombings. The problem is political, not religious.